Journal of Iran and Regional Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, 2025

Journal of Iran and Regional Studies

Home Page: https://jices.ut.ac.ir/

China's Strategic Partnerships as Economic Statecraft: The Case of China-Egypt Partnership

Mohammad Soltaninejad[1*], Seyed Bagher Salehi Mouzan[2]

1. Corresponding Author, Department of West Asian and African Studies, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Email: soltaninejad@ut.ac.ir
2. Department of West Asian and African Studies, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.Email: baghersalehi@ut.ac.ir

Article Info

Article type:
Research Article

Article History:
Received 25 August 2025
Revised 02 October 2025
Accepted 27 December 2025
Published Online 26 January 2026

Keywords:
Strategic partnership,
Economic statecraft,
Belt and Road Initiative,
China,
Egypt.

ABSTRACT

Despite its frequent use, the term 'partnership,' as recently employed by China to describe its strategic partnerships and relations with friendly states, has received little scholarly attention, and its dimensions remain underexplored. This article argues that China's partnerships can be better understood through the lens of economic statecraft—a foreign policy approach wherein states actively deploy economic tools to achieve political objectives. It explores the relationship between China's strategic partnerships and economic statecraft, as traditionally referenced in the field of international political economy, analysing China–Egypt partnership as a case study. The paper contends that China's partnerships have not only, as suggested by the notion of economic statecraft, led to deeper economic interdependence, but have also enabled China to consolidate its strategic influence in the regions spanning along the so-called Belt and Road project. Accordingly, China's strategic partnerships can be viewed as manifestations of the traditional economic statecraft strategy; however, given the diversity and the formation of expansive, multi-layered networks of partnerships, the application of this framework is not limited to the mere use of economic tools for exerting influence over a single country or group of countries. Rather, such partnerships—through a complex integration of geopolitical, institutional, and diplomatic elements—transcend traditional understandings of economic statecraft, evolving into a more comprehensive and multi-layered form of strategic agency in international politics.

Cite this article: Soltaninejad, M., & Salehi Mouzan, B. (2025). China's strategic partnerships as economic statecraft: The case of china-egypt partnership. *Journal of Iran and Regional Studies*, 8 (2), 125-143. https://doi.org/10.22059/jices.2025.401265.1100

Publisher: University of Tehran Press.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22059/jices.2025.401265.1100

Introduction

In recent decades, China has redefined its foreign policy through a multidimensional approach that incorporates economic instruments and institutional mechanisms, thereby reconstructing its strategic position within the international order. This transformation is most clearly manifested in China's extensive use of *strategic partnerships* and initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which structurally differ from traditional models of military alliances, emphasizing economic cooperation, interdependence, and infrastructure development. However, the concept of strategic partnerships remains underdeveloped in the scholarly literature, with many researchers equating them with alliances or coalitions without fully appreciating their distinctive characteristics (Norris, 2016; Wiśniewski, 2020). To address this conceptual gap, the present article proposes that a clearer understanding of China's strategic partnerships can be achieved by examining their relationship with the concept of "economic statecraft" in international relations. In its common international application, economic statecraft refers to the deliberate use of economic tools by states to advance geopolitical objectives and influence the behavior of other actors. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which primarily relied on military or political instruments, this approach focuses on leveraging trade, investment, technology transfer, and economic dependence as tools of influence. Baldwin (2020) categorizes economic statecraft into two main types: "positive" instruments, such as trade and investment, and "negative" instruments, such as sanctions or economic disengagement. The use of these instruments can transform economic interdependencies into mechanisms of influence without resorting to military force. From this perspective, economic statecraft is not merely an economic activity; it represents a form of structural power in the international system that enables states to shape institutional, financial, or global supply chain structures in accordance with their strategic interests.

Within this framework, the central question arises: can China's strategic partnerships—which ostensibly focuses on the development of bilateral relations with an economic emphasis—be regarded as a manifestation or specific instrument of economic statecraft? In other words, is the concept of strategic partnership merely a new term for describing a long-standing behavioral pattern within the framework of economic statecraft, or does it possess distinctive and independent characteristics? If these two concepts are considered synonymous, strategic partnerships should be seen as part of China's broader strategy to leverage economic power to guide the policies of various states and influence their strategies in its favor. Alternatively, strategic partnerships may have unique features that go beyond traditional economic statecraft, reflecting China's capacity to offer an alternative model of international relations. In this regard, the present article hypothesizes and tests that China's strategic partnerships—through the creation of political and strategic influence in partner countries—are symbols of economic statecraft, while simultaneously extending beyond it and serving as key tools to enhance China's strategic capabilities in global power competition. In other words, strategic partnerships represent a contemporary and evolved form of economic statecraft that not only increases China's political and strategic influence over specific states but also functions as a step toward reshaping the global order.

To clarify the relationship between strategic partnerships and economic statecraft, it can be argued that these two concepts are not separate domains but rather synergistic dimensions of international agency. In other words, the key elements of economic statecraft can be observed through strategic partnerships. By creating mutual economic dependencies, strategically employing investments and infrastructure projects, and leveraging economic power for political and strategic influence, strategic partnerships essentially serve as instruments for achieving foreign policy objectives. From this theoretical perspective, strategic partnerships can be interpreted as an institutionalized framework for the implementation of economic statecraft. These partnerships create mutual economic dependencies, employ investments and infrastructure projects, and utilize economic power for political and strategic influence, thus providing a sustainable mechanism for transforming economic resources into political and geopolitical capital. Moreover, while the existing literature predominantly conceptualizes economic statecraft as an instrumental tool, this study argues that strategic partnerships are its institutionalized and structured realization. Strategic partnerships acquire real meaning and functionality only when grounded in economic resources and leverage; otherwise, they remain limited to political declarations or symbolic cooperation. Therefore, strategic partnerships can be seen as an institutional embodiment of economic statecraft that enables states to exercise sustainable economic influence and convert it into political and geopolitical capital.

To empirically examine this relationship, the present study selects China's partnership with Egypt as a case study. This partnership, primarily focused on economic and trade cooperation, demonstrates how China leverages its strategic partnerships as instruments of economic statecraft. If successful, the China–Egypt partnership not only enhances China's influence in West Asia (the Middle East) and Africa but also provides a prominent example of applying strategic partnerships within the framework of economic statecraft to achieve geopolitical objectives. Accordingly, the article is organized into four sections: first, the theoretical framework of economic statecraft is defined and its indicators identified; second, the types of China's strategic partnerships are examined with illustrative examples; third, the China–Egypt strategic partnership is analyzed as a case of economic statecraft, demonstrating how China employs the concept's indicators to advance its objectives in Egypt and beyond; and finally, the fourth section discusses the implications of this strategic partnership for Egypt.

Conceptual Framework: Economic Statecraft

The notion of economic statecraft has increasingly been employed to describe China's use of economic resources to achieve political, economic, and strategic objectives (Norris, 2016). In the 1980s, when China was in the early stages of its reform and opening-up policies under Deng Xiaoping, the practice of economic statecraft remained limited and was scarcely reflected in contemporary scholarship. However, subsequent studies—most notably Baldwin's revised edition (2020) and Kapstein's analysis (2020)—have emphasized the extensive and expanding role of economic statecraft in China's foreign policy in later decades (Kapstein, 2020). Norris (2016) similarly characterizes China's advanced reliance on economic tools in foreign policy as a relatively recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, historical research indicates that Chinese leaders, since the early twentieth century and even earlier, consistently sought to employ economic influence as a foreign policy instrument. Thus, the contemporary manifestations of China's economic statecraft can be traced back not only to the establishment of the People's Republic of China but also to China's earlier experiences since the 1900s (Reilly, 2013).

Economic statecraft constitutes a distinct strand of international relations analysis that focuses on the deliberate use of economic instruments by states to advance foreign policy objectives and safeguard national interests. The concept highlights how economic power can be converted into an instrument of influence, thereby shaping a state's geopolitical position within the international system. David Baldwin (2020) defines economic statecraft as "influence attempts that rely primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money." In this sense, the term economic refers solely to the instruments employed, whereas the ultimate objectives may be strategic or political in nature. Baldwin critiques alternative expressions such as economic foreign policy, economic diplomacy, and economic warfare, advancing instead a typology that divides the instruments of economic statecraft into coercive and cooperative categories. Coercive tools include sanctions and trade restrictions, while cooperative tools encompass trade agreements and foreign aid, both of which shape the geopolitical standing of states by influencing governments and non-state actors alike (Baldwin, 2020).

Unlike domestic economic management, economic statecraft involves the strategic use of trade, investment, sanctions, aid, and financial mechanisms in foreign policy to influence other actors, reshape institutions, and alter balances of economic and political power. It thus serves as a modern modality of power projection and global governance. By focusing exclusively on economic instruments and strategic objectives, the concept provides a clear analytical framework that captures the interplay of competition and cooperation in linking economics and politics (Freedman, 1986; Kapstein, 2020) Building on Baldwin's framework, William J. Norris and others have sought to extend the analysis of economic statecraft by emphasizing its capacity to deliberately steer the behavior of economic actors and to manage international relations in a structured manner. Norris (2016) argues that governments employ economic tools such as sanctions, tariffs, subsidies, and trade agreements to shape commercial behavior in ways that yield favorable security outcomes for national strategic interests. While security consequences can emerge as byproducts of economic activity, economic statecraft refers to the intentional use of state policy to generate these outcomes (Norris, 2016).

The present study moves beyond both Baldwin's and Norris's perspectives by situating strategic partnerships as the institutionalized expression of economic statecraft. In this expanded conception, economic statecraft is not confined to ad hoc measures such as sanctions, loans, or investment, nor is it merely a tactical means of exerting temporary influence. Rather, it is understood as a structured and institutionalized process through which states manage, direct, and optimize domestic and international economic conditions. Defined in this way, economic statecraft entails the purposeful use of economic instruments, the creation of interdependence, the reproduction of institutional rules and norms, and the integration of economic mechanisms into the broader geopolitical architecture. It is not only a means of exercising economic influence but also a platform for shaping international order, enhancing strategic capacities, and ensuring long-term economic security. Strategic partnerships, within this framework, represent the contemporary and operational manifestation of economic statecraft, incorporating all these dimensions in both bilateral and multilateral interactions.

Accordingly, this study seeks to identify the key elements of economic statecraft and highlight its intersections with the concept of strategic partnership. The first and most essential element is the close relationship between economics and foreign policy. States employ economic instruments to strengthen diplomatic ties and expand international engagement. These measures aim to generate mutual economic interdependence and secure long-term benefits through trade relations, strategic investments, and institutionalized economic agreements. The second element is the use of economic power as leverage to influence the domestic and foreign policies of other countries. This approach allows governments to effectively play a role in regional and global issues through the "economization of diplomacy." Tools such as sanctions, economic incentives, and trade facilities are among the key mechanisms in this area.

The third element of economic statecraft is the interactive nature of economic power. Within this framework, the economy is not only a field for competition but also a platform for cooperation and partnership with other international actors. Governments rely on their economic capacities to create models of mutual cooperation aimed at securing economic and political interests on a global scale. The fourth element is global economic order-building. Governments, aiming to stabilize or elevate their position in the international system, seek to create or redefine global economic rules. Utilizing international organizations, institutions, and agreements to exert influence in the process of global economic governance is part of this strategy. The fifth element is the increasing overlap between the spheres of economy and security. In economic statecraft, the traditional distinction between these two areas is fading. Governments use economic tools to ensure national security, enhance strategic capabilities, and reduce vulnerability to external threats. This convergence of economy and security highlights the growing importance of "economic security" in government policymaking.

Finally, attention to structural advantages is another pillar of economic statecraft. Governments leverage natural resources, geographical location, and developed infrastructure as assets to increase their economic and geopolitical power. These advantages enable greater influence in the global order and a more active role in international economic interactions. Infrastructure investments are also among the most important operational components of economic statecraft, especially in engagement with developing countries. Initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative are prominent examples of this approach, which, by implementing infrastructure projects, not only support the economic growth of partner countries but also provide a suitable platform for strengthening political influence.

Based on all that has been examined, our main argument is that strategic partnership can be a fundamental tool in securing economic statecraft and even extend beyond it. In this approach, strategic partnership is regarded as an updated form of economic statecraft; one that ensures the interests of the implementing country both in bilateral interactions with the target country and in the broader arena of international relations and in dealing with other global powers. In other words, strategic partnership encompasses all the essential components of economic statecraft. The first component is the explicit link between the economy and foreign policy within the framework of strategic partnerships. Governments, by utilizing this type of relationship, create mutual economic dependencies and, through tools such as trade, investment, and bilateral agreements, guarantee their long-term interests in foreign policy vis-à-vis target states (Ferchen & Mattlin, 2023). Second, strategic partnerships allow major economic powers to use large-scale investments, financial facilities, and infrastructure projects as levers to exert influence and guide the policies of partner countries. Numerous studies have shown that governments, especially in relations between great powers and developing countries, use economic policies as instruments of pressure and influence over the strategic decision-making of the counterpart (Baldwin, 2020). This purposeful use of economic power clearly illustrates the nature of economic statecraft.

Beyond these two characteristics shared between strategic partnerships and economic statecraft, strategic partnerships fulfil three additional objectives. First, the power implementing the strategic partnership uses it to enhance its capabilities on the international stage. A prominent example is the economic partnerships between China and African countries, which simultaneously increase economic cooperation and strengthen China's geopolitical influence (Power & Mohan, 2010). Second, the larger state in a strategic partnership engages in global economic order-building by leveraging its network of strategic partnerships. This state plays a role in setting trade, financial, and investment standards and redefines the rules of the game in the international economy through these partnerships. A concrete example of this process is China's Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to increase the economic dependence of other countries on China's economy and redefine its position in the global economic order (De Beule et al., 2024). Third, the major and active state in the strategic partnership uses it to secure its economic security on the international stage. Through its network of strategic partnerships, the state strives to secure vital resources, reduce dependence on unreliable actors, and enhance its economic resilience (Wishnick, 2007). States utilize these partnerships to ensure access to critical resources, minimize reliance on uncertain actors, and increase economic flexibility (Wishnick, 2007). This approach is especially prominent in energy-related relations and the supply of strategic raw materials, with many strategic agreements between countries formed to guarantee the security of key resource supplies (Oliveira, 2016)

Ultimately, the state driving the strategic partnership uses it as a tool to strengthen its advantages, economic and geopolitical position, and increase its international influence (Wishnick, 2007). These advantages play a decisive role in determining the priorities of strategic partnerships and shaping economic agreements. Studies show that states with key geographical locations leverage strategic partnerships to convert their position into a competitive advantage (Tyushka et al., 2019). Based on the analysis presented, strategic partnership should be considered a prominent form of economic statecraft; a framework through which states employ economic tools to achieve their strategic objectives. This concept goes beyond a simple diplomatic or security agreement and must be analyzed within a broader context that includes economic strategies, international order-building, and the redefinition of geopolitical balances.

China's Strategic Partnerships

Since 1949, China's foreign policy has undergone significant transformations, shifting from isolationism to active global engagement. During the Cold War, it pursued tactical alliances, and by the 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping's emphasis on autonomy, adopted a policy of non-alignment. From the 1990s onward, China expanded its international presence through strategic partnerships and transitioned from ideological to pragmatic diplomacy. This shift—characterized by participatory diplomacy and balancing powers—aims to foster multipolarity and counter U.S. hegemony. These partnerships, blending defensive logic and assertiveness, provide a conducive environment for China's economic expansion. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China seeks to reform the global order and attract international support. Strategic partnerships serve to strengthen ties with potential allies and advance China's global interests, facilitating mutual assurance and a wide network of cooperation. The diversity of these partnerships—covering 78 countries and 5 regional organizations—reflects China's calculated foreign policy (Ghafarzadeh et al., 2023). Beijing uses labels such as "Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation" (e.g., with Russia) and "Unique Strategic Partnership" (e.g., with Pakistan) to signal relationship depth. Though undefined formally, official documents emphasize principles like equality, peace, and inclusiveness (Yue, 2018). With terms like "strategic," "comprehensive," and "cooperative," China has crafted a flexible yet purpose-driven framework for its foreign relations (Yue, 2018).

Strategic partnerships are typically long-term arrangements aligned with China's core interests—security (sovereignty, national integrity, regional stability), economy, and international standing (Smith, 2014). China expects its partners to respect these strategic boundaries. Partnerships fall into three main categories: strategic partnership, partnership, and potential partnership, each with further sublevels (Yue, 2018). This study focuses on the first category, comprising nearly 80 strategic partnerships central to China's diplomatic network. These reflect national priorities such as the One-China principle, national security, regional peace, and global stability. Strategic partners are expected to align with China's interests and collaborate in specific domains (Yue, 2018). These partnerships are hierarchically structured into six levels: Coordinated Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership, Strategic Cooperative Partnership, Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Strategic Partnership, and Strategic Cooperative Relationship.

Since linguistic distinctions between levels are subtle, actual classification depends on analyzing official documents and bilateral practices. The Coordinated Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia occupies the top tier (Yue, 2018). Joint declarations reveal regular high-level visits, institutionalized communication across energy, trade, and investment, regional cooperation, law enforcement, strategic security, and cultural exchange. Mutual political trust manifests in strong support for each other's sovereignty and development goals (Yue, 2018). This robust cooperation extends to aligning national strategies and joint participation in initiatives like BRI and AIIB, and multilateral forums such as the UN, G20, BRICS, APEC, SCO, and CICA (Yu, 2025). At its core lies a shared discontent with U.S. hegemony and unilateralism, and a desire to counterbalance it through collaboration (Yu & Sui, 2020).

One tier below are the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnerships and Strategic Cooperative Partnerships (Yue, 2018). The term “comprehensive” indicates broader cooperation, while “strategic” implies alignment at a high level. Countries in this tier are expected to support and frequently coordinate with China on major international and regional issues. Of 18 such partners, 11 are Asian neighbors, reflecting China’s emphasis on a stable regional environment. The other 7 are least developed African countries, which, while less strategically vital, allow China to expand its influence and project itself as a “responsible power”. Official statements often reference China’s “traditional friendship with African brothers,” its identity as a fellow developing country, and its pledge to offer “sincere and selfless support” (Yue, 2018).

Not all partners fully align with China. Some strategic partnerships face unresolved tensions but continue with a shared commitment to cooperation—examples include South Korea and India. Despite differing interests, such partnerships maintain common diplomatic language (Yue, 2018). Lower-level partnerships include Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, Strategic Partnerships, and Strategic Cooperative Relations (Ghafarzadeh et al., 2023; Yue, 2018). These partners are geographically diverse and strategically varied. Europe is a key focus in this category, with China’s partnerships including Germany (comprehensive), the United Kingdom (global for the 21st century), and others with France, Italy, Spain, and the EU. These relationships prioritize geopolitical relevance and regional influence over economic weight. Both sides emphasize “shared strategic vision for a multipolar world” and regard themselves as “key actors in promoting peace and stability” (Yue, 2018). However, deep ideological gaps often limit the potential for closer ties. Egypt is also included in this category.

Several partnerships involve neighbouring countries, particularly those vital for China’s energy needs and international infrastructure projects. Countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road are critical to China’s connectivity goals. Lack of access through these countries could jeopardize BRI initiatives. More distant nations tend to hold weaker strategic ties, and their partnership labels reflect this. For instance, China-Ireland’s “mutual benefit” partnership focuses on trade, while the “Innovative Strategic Partnership” with Switzerland supports China’s “Made in China 2025” plan through high-tech cooperation. Beyond the EU, China has designated other regional organizations—African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Arab League—as strategic partners, seeking to consolidate regional influence and promote multipolarity through multilateralism (Yue, 2018).

The second and third categories—partnerships and potential partnerships—comprise 35 additional relationships. These include comprehensive cooperative partnerships, cooperative partnerships, and friendly cooperative relations. The absence of the term “strategic” signals their lower significance. These states either lack strong bilateral ties or global influence and offer limited value to China. Still, maintaining cordial relations helps China position itself as a "responsible power" willing to share development opportunities on equal terms. These ties also reflect China's foreign policy values—aiming for friendship with as many countries as possible. Economically focused, these partnerships remain flexible and can be upgraded when mutual interests align or bilateral ties deepen (Yue, 2018). While this article focuses on strategic partnerships as expressions of positive economic statecraft, it also considers the symbolic dimension of China's strategy—using hierarchical labels to motivate partners toward deeper cooperation. Unlike coercive tools like sanctions or conditional aid, China employs structured hope as a soft tool of influence, creating a symbolic economic-political order that incentivizes states to remain engaged. This method relies not on immediate material benefits but on promises of credibility, gradual inclusion in Chinese-led multilateralism, and signals of elevated status. In this context, what matters is not only the outcomes of partnership but the process of aspirational engagement, crafted through diplomatic subtlety and institutional consistency. Empirical evidence for this strategy is seen in China's relations with many developing countries in Africa, the West Asia, and Central Asia. As Ian Taylor notes, China accumulates "long-term political capital" not through coercion but by symbolically signalling partnership upgrades (Taylor, 2009). Thus, the strategic partnership hierarchy serves not only to deepen cooperation but also as an expectation-management mechanism, keeping states engaged and increasingly integrated into China's preferred international economic order. This structured hope and symbolic incentive are foundational elements of China's soft economic hegemony.

China–Egypt Strategic Partnership within the Framework of Economic Statecraft

Relations between China and Egypt began in 1956 when Egypt became the first Arab and African country to recognize the People's Republic of China. Rooted in Egypt's independent foreign policy and Gamal Abdel Nasser's anti-colonial stance, early cooperation was mainly political and diplomatic within the Non-Aligned Movement, supporting sovereignty and non-interference. With China's 1980s economic reforms and Egypt's privatization, bilateral ties expanded to trade and investments. China saw Egypt as a gateway to African and Arab markets, boosting trade and joint projects. By the early 2000s, economic cooperation intensified, culminating in the 2006 "Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement" covering infrastructure, energy, and industrial zones (Elmaghraby, 2023). China became a key trading partner, with growing investments in ports, technical collaboration, and energy (Gadallah, 2016).

A major shift occurred in 2014 with the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement" under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This involved large investments in transportation, energy, industry, and IT, including the Suez Canal Economic Zone, Egypt's new administrative capital, and renewable energy. Military cooperation also expanded, with China supplying defence technologies (Selim & Moaaz, 2021). This partnership reflects China's distinctive development model, combining economic and political goals beyond traditional diplomacy into a multi-layered strategic framework.

The infrastructure dimension is central, focusing on transport corridors linking Asia and Africa via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, boosting Egypt's role in global supply chains ((Shumilov & Malova, 2024). Projects like Ain Sokhna Port, railway expansions, and integration into China's trade routes reduce transit times and enhance Egypt's geo-economics status. Over 10% of global trade passes through the Suez Canal, with Chinese investments facilitating flow to Europe and North Africa (Rakha & El-Aasar, 2024; Zreik, 2024). Energy cooperation includes solar and wind plants like the Benban Solar Park, gas infrastructure, and grid upgrades, meeting Egypt's energy needs while securing China's access to African and Mediterranean markets. Joint industrial zones, especially the China–Egypt TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, host dozens of Chinese firms in electronics, chemicals, textiles, and machinery (Scott, 2013). These zones promote FDI, technology transfer, production capacity, and job creation (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2011). Over 120 Chinese companies operate there, generating substantial exports. The partnership involves complex investment structures, including joint ventures, technology transfer, local content rules, and risk sharing (Beltaji & Marwa, 2017), focused strategically on transport hubs, energy, industrial, and digital infrastructure.

The second dimension is political and diplomatic alignment, underpinning cooperation through global legitimacy, policy coordination, and multilateral engagement (Selim & Moaaz, 2021). Since 2014, high-level dialogue has intensified, marked by Xi Jinping's 2016 Cairo visit and frequent exchanges. Egypt and China cooperate closely in the UN on sustainable development, economic justice, and global governance reform. Egypt's BRICS membership from 2024 enhances its role in shaping the non-Western economic and political agenda. Egypt's 2022 SCO dialogue partner status deepens political-security ties, alongside participation in China-led initiatives like the Global Development and Security Initiatives. This layer connects other partnership dimensions, enabling coordinated diplomacy and broader cooperation.

The third dimension is economic, driving long-term engagement through FDI, trade, and finance, aligning with China's South–South cooperation and Egypt's Vision 2030 reforms (Chen, 2018). Key investments include the new administrative capital, where China State Construction Engineering Corporation is investing over $3 billion, including the 385-meter Iconic Tower—Africa's tallest building (Abozaied et al., 2025). The Ain Sokhna Economic Zone hosts hundreds of Chinese SMEs in petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, auto parts, and electronics, attracting over $1.6 billion in FDI by 2023 and creating thousands of jobs. China is Egypt's top trading partner; 2022 trade exceeded $15 billion, mainly Chinese machinery and electronics exports and Egyptian raw materials and agricultural products (Reda Abu Hatab et al., 2012). Financial cooperation includes currency swaps and yuan usage to reduce US dollar reliance (MA & ZHAO, 2020). This economic interdependence supports political and geopolitical cooperation, exemplifying South–South economic statecraft.

The fourth dimension, security and military cooperation, represents a tangible manifestation of the depth of interaction and coordination between Egypt and China within the framework of their strategic partnership. Since around 2014, reports and open-source databases have indicated a multi-layered technical-military engagement between the two countries (El-Din, 2025). This cooperation includes the deployment of Wing Loong I and II UAVs for reconnaissance and strike operations in northern Sinai, the acquisition of Chinese anti-ship missiles from the export C-802/YJ-83 family, and the employment of HQ-9B long-range air defense systems to enhance Egypt's air and naval defense capabilities (defense-arabic, 2025; salem, 2017) Moreover, this cooperation has expanded to include joint military and naval exercises, security information sharing, training of Egyptian officers in China, and participation in counterterrorism maneuvers. In recent years, Egypt has shown interest in acquiring J-10C fighter jets to strengthen its air capabilities, and participation in joint air exercises with China has increased the country's operational experience and tactical coordination (Helou, April 22, 2025).

Despite the expansion of military and security cooperation between Egypt and China, these interactions occur within the context of Egypt's historical dependence on the United States. The majority of Egypt's equipment, training, and armed forces operations continue to be provided through the U.S., and strategic relations with Washington constitute the backbone of the country's defense capabilities (Chaziza, 2016). Within this framework, engagement with China is largely symbolic and complementary, aimed primarily at diversifying arms sources and creating balance in foreign relations. From this perspective, interaction with China is not a substitute but a strategic supplement to the existing security and defense framework, enabling Egypt to expand its operational and diplomatic capacities while maintaining its reliance on the U.S (International, 2025; Sun, 2017). Cybersecurity constitutes another dimension of Egypt-China cooperation. The integration of Chinese surveillance and security technologies into Egypt's domestic infrastructure, including border control systems, smart surveillance cameras, and security data analysis networks, reflects an overlap between digital governance and national security (He, 2022). These measures not only enhance Egypt's ability to prevent and respond to internal and terrorist threats but also enable the collection and analysis of strategic information for security and defense decision-making (Choudhury & Jacob, 2025; Dahdal & Ghafar, 2025).

Strategically, Egypt's geopolitical position near the Suez Canal makes it a key point for maritime security and the protection of transit routes under China's Belt and Road Initiative. This strategic location has meant that cooperation goes beyond equipment and technology, encompassing coordination in maritime intelligence, joint security maneuvers, and the exchange of strategic experiences in maritime security and countering transnational threats (Krukowska, 2024; Sun & Xu, 2023). Egypt's active participation as a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its support for China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) demonstrate the convergence of strategic interests between the two countries (service & Egypt, 2025). This convergence aims to enhance regional stability, counter extremism, address transnational threats, and diversify security partnerships beyond Western powers. It not only strengthens military and security cooperation but also creates opportunities for cybersecurity technology exchange, security personnel training, and the development of legal and operational frameworks to manage digital and cyber threats. Overall, while still operating under the shadow of U.S. support and equipment, Egypt-China military and security cooperation has gradually enhanced Egypt's defense capabilities and diversified its military and armament sources (Fulton & Council, 2020).

The fifth dimension covers cultural, social, and soft-power ties fostering mutual understanding and support for other cooperation areas. Initiatives include art, cinema, music, Confucius Institutes, and scholarships in engineering and sciences, enhancing academic and research exchange under BRI educational diplomacy (Shih & Cao, 2022). Around 10,000–30,000 scholarships have been allocated to BRI countries, including Egypt. Growing trade and tourism, with direct flights and joint projects, boost people-to-people connections. Cultural tourism to Egypt's heritage sites is increasingly popular among Chinese visitors. Social cooperation in health, environment, and urban development promotes sustainable growth and urban infrastructure improvements. These efforts deepen cultural interaction and reinforce economic and political layers, serving as a soft-power strategy for a stable, long-term China–Egypt relationship.

Consequences of the Partnership for Egypt: From Capacity Building to Strategic Dependence

While the strategic partnership between China and Egypt has provided significant economic and infrastructural capacities for Cairo, this relationship, within the framework of economic statecraft, carries complex consequences that tend to push its nature toward a form of multidimensional dependence. If not managed intelligently, these consequences may jeopardize Egypt's policy independence in economic, security, and cultural domains. China's substantial investments in Egyptian infrastructure projects—such as transport corridors, energy networks, and industrial zones—not only have helped increase Egypt's economic capacities but also strengthened China's geopolitical position in North Africa (Horn et al., 2021). These collaborations have created a mutual economic dependence which, alongside economic benefits, bring specific economic, security, and cultural consequences requiring careful examination. Thus, the strategic partnership between China and Egypt, framed within economic statecraft, is effectively marked by a clear pattern of power asymmetry that carries important geopolitical implications. China, through tools like technology transfer, targeted scholarships, infrastructure investments, and industrial zone development, not only strengthens Egypt's economic capacity but gradually influences its decision-making structures and priority-setting. In contrast, Egypt mostly remains in a recipient position and lacks institutional capacity to exert reciprocal influence on China's geopolitical or scientific structures.

The expansion of Confucius Institutes, scholarship programs, and Chinese media cooperation in Egypt is gradually redefining cultural and educational patterns among Egyptian elites (Duchesne, 2023). These measures are part of China's soft power strategy, which can lead to the gradual alignment of behavioural models and cultural values with China's governance model. These potential changes affect Egypt's strategic orientations in foreign policy and need to be closely analyzed and monitored. For example, China's scholarships to Egyptian students in fields such as engineering, technology, and basic sciences, although seemingly tools for human development, can also be interpreted within the framework of soft power and China's long-term influence on Egypt's future elites. Such mechanisms turn Egypt into a dependent actor within China's power architecture, where scientific, technological, and infrastructural dependence gradually undermines Egypt's strategic autonomy. In the long term, this could limit Egypt's capacity for independent decision-making in fields such as industrial policy, digitalization, or even foreign policy towards China, turning the country into a peripheral dependent player within China's geopolitical design.

The growing China-Egypt partnership in the security domain carries consequences beyond mere economic cooperation and can lead to a reconfiguration of security balances in North Africa. Egypt's increasing dependence on China for surveillance technologies, biometric identification systems, and military equipment is part of Beijing's economic statecraft pattern through which it extends its geopolitical influence into sensitive security infrastructures. These partnerships not only diversify Egypt's arms sources and reduce Western dependence but might also, in the long run, alter Cairo's security policy patterns and gradually align them with China's authoritarian technological model. Similar patterns are observed in Pakistan with arms transfers and military training, and in South Africa with Chinese investment in cybersecurity. Therefore, expanding such partnerships can have consequences like weakening transparency and accountability standards in security and strengthening surveillance regimes (Rolland, 2017). China's large investments in Egypt's key infrastructure projects—such as the development of the Suez Canal Economic Zone, energy projects, and industrial zones—are mostly financed through government loans and financial facilities, which have put pressure on Egypt's external debt structure (Rolland, 2017). This type of financing has been identified as examples of "Debt Trap Diplomacy" or "Debt Traps" in similar cases in other developing countries. For instance, Kenya, after receiving large loans from China for the Standard Gauge Railway project, faced serious repayment challenges that sparked discussions about granting port concessions to China (Horn et al., 2021). Sri Lanka is a prominent example with the handover of Hambantota port to China after failing to repay debts, raising concerns about the repetition of such a scenario in Egypt (Wibisono, 2019). Such financial dependence could limit Egypt's ability to adopt independent economic policies and pose significant economic risks.

The increasing presence of Chinese companies and investments in Egypt's sensitive infrastructures, including transport networks, communication systems, and ports, has raised concerns about structural influence, access to critical data, and long-term control over strategic infrastructures. The experience of the port of Piraeus in Greece, a key point in the Eastern Mediterranean, exemplifies how China leverages infrastructure investments to deepen its geopolitical influence; where the China Ocean Shipping Company's ownership of the majority shares of the port sparked controversies about security and strategic consequences for Europe and NATO. Similar concerns are raised in Egypt about China's expanding influence in critical infrastructures, especially in the Suez Canal Economic Zone and projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative. Some analysts view this trend as a potential threat to national security and decision-making independence in sensitive areas (Hillman, 2020).

The lack of diversification in investment and technology sources in partnership with China exposes Egypt to risks of unipolarization and political-economic pressures from China. This pattern, observed in other countries in Southeast Asia and Africa, reflects China's economic statecraft approach in international relations. In other words, this partnership goes beyond a purely economic relationship and serves as a tool to redefine power balances and expand China's geopolitical influence in the region. From this perspective, analysing the multilayered consequences of this partnership for Egypt—economically, security-wise, and culturally—is key to understanding the dynamics of power and the extent of policy independence Egypt can maintain going forward. Egypt, in harnessing the capacities of this cooperation, must simultaneously enhance risk management mechanisms and strengthen policies of economic and security diversification to avoid falling into strategic dependence traps.

Conclusion

China's strategic partnerships can be analyzed within the framework of "economic statecraft"; however, given the diversity and formation of extensive, multi-level networks of partnerships, the application of this framework is not limited to merely using economic tools for influence. Rather, this partnership, with its complex integration and simultaneity of geopolitical, institutional, and diplomatic elements, has transformed into a multilayered and more comprehensive form of strategic agency in the arena of international politics. Although the apparent focus of this cooperation is on economic domains, it reveals a coherent structure in which economic tools are integrated with political interests and geopolitical objectives. Therefore, this model goes beyond traditional versions of economic statecraft based on pressure and influence, and can be considered an evolved and sophisticated example of the ways emerging powers, particularly China, exercise agency in the modern international system.

Evidence from the Egypt case study confirms that China's strategic partnerships exemplify economic statecraft where economic power serves political and security objectives; with the difference that in this partnership, the complexity and flexibility of mechanisms are notably enhanced. Cooperation in infrastructure projects, investments in energy and industry, financing of large-scale structures, and transfer of key technologies are all dimensions that appear economic on the surface but in reality are tools to deepen geopolitical influence and redefine China's position in regional and trans-regional orders. These features—including the overlap of economy and security, the formation of mutual dependencies, leveraging Egypt's geopolitical advantages, and deepening cultural and technological ties—show that the China-Egypt strategic partnership has become a model in which the traditional boundaries of international interactions dissolve and a new form of power practice emerges; a form governed by the logic of interaction rather than imposition, and emphasizing synergy of advantages rather than balance of power. This study specifically demonstrates that China utilizes a diverse set of tools to realize a multilayered influence pattern, in which three key but interconnected mechanisms can be distinguished: first, infrastructure-based integration, implemented through projects like Egypt's New Administrative Capital and the Suez Canal Economic Zone, which create tangible and long-term dependencies; second, political institutionalization, strengthened by formal agreements, developmental cooperation, and promotion of alternative governance models; and third, technological and security dependence, established via the transfer of advanced technologies and military cooperation, reinforcing political alignment.

Furthermore, the strategic partnership in the Egypt example indicates that, unlike Western unilateral policies, China is attempting, through a gradual and participatory model, to partner in rebuilding the regional order. Thus, the strategic partnership serves not only as a tool for geopolitical competition with the West but also as a platform for testing an alternative model of international relations from the perspective of non-Western powers. The article shows that the China-Egypt strategic partnership is a vivid and multifaceted example of 21st-century economic statecraft; a model where economy, politics, security, and culture are intertwined and employed to enhance China's structural influence regionally and globally. This conclusion not only confirms the article's hypothesis but also suggests that analysing strategic partnerships in international relations requires new analytical frameworks sensitive to the integrative logic of agency and aware of emerging order-building processes. Theoretically, this article, using the economic statecraft framework, attempts to demonstrate that understanding the behaviour of emerging powers is incomplete without targeted analysis of the link between economic tools and geopolitical objectives. The China-Egypt strategic partnership shows that China, relying on financial resources, technology, and institutional networks, has deepened its political influence in regions such as North Africa within a framework that appears aligned with South-South cooperation standards, mutual respect, and non-interference but in practice represents a redefinition of power-based relations.

China's experience in Africa and West Asia the demonstrates that its economic strategy—often conceptualized as "economic statecraft" or state-led economic governance—relies on a combination of financial instruments, foreign direct investment, infrastructure projects, and the establishment of special economic zones. In Africa, following the FOCAC summit in 2000, China systematically deployed these tools to promote joint economic development, foster mutual dependencies, and expand its political influence. The African experience, in particular, shows that the establishment of special economic zones in countries such as Egypt, Nigeria, Zambia, and Ethiopia was not merely aimed at short-term economic presence, but formed part of China's long-term strategy to restructure global production and export chains (Aidi, 2018; Winton, 2013). In West Asia, China has primarily focused on investment, institutional cooperation, and economic agreements to create stable relationships and a favorable environment for economic and diplomatic influence. Comparative analysis indicates that, regardless of geography, China's economic statecraft combines short-term objectives—such as market development, resource utilization, and investment opportunities—with long-term goals, including consolidating political influence, creating economic interdependencies, and mitigating pressure from competitors (Li, 2020; Roberts, 2021).

Just as economic tools were primarily used in relations with Vietnam and ASEAN to manage security threats and reduce pressure from third powers, in Africa China has leveraged soft loans and infrastructure investment to create long-term mutual dependencies, thereby achieving political and geopolitical objectives through "soft power." Consequently, whether in its eastern neighborhood or on the African continent, economic incentives have largely replaced military coercion; the difference lies in function—serving primarily deterrence and crisis management in Southeast Asia, while assuming a more structural and developmental role in Africa. This comparison demonstrates that the findings of the present study on Egypt and West Asia can be interpreted within a broader framework of China's economic statecraft, in which the interplay between economic development, geopolitical influence, and threat management constitutes three interdependent pillars of a strategic triangle (Chheang, 2018; Li, 2017).

The authors declare that they have fully observed all ethical issues including plagiarism, double publication and/or submission, redundancy, data fabrication and/or falsification, informed consent, misconduct, etc.

References

Abozaied, S. et al. (2025). Assessing Chinese–Egyptian bilateral trade dynamics under the One Belt One Road initiative: augmented gravity model approach. *African Journal of Economic and Management Studies*. 17(1) . DOI: 10.1108/AJEMS-06-2024-0347

Aidi, H. (2018). *China's Economic Statecraft in Africa*. OCP Policy Center.

Baldwin, D. A. (2020). *Economic statecraft: New edition*. Princeton University Press.

Beltaji, A., & Marwa, A. D. (2017). The Suez Canal area for economic cooperation and trade between Egypt and China. *Asian Horizons*, *1*(1), 17-28.

Brautigam, D., & Xiaoyang, T. (2011). China's investment in special economic zones in Africa. *Special economic zones: Progress, emerging challenges, and future directions*, *32*.

Chaziza, M. (2016). COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A NEW STAGE IN CHINA-EGYPT RELATIONS. *Meria Journal*, *20*(3).

Chen, J. (2018). Strategic synergy between Egypt "Vision 2030" and China's "Belt and Road" initiative. *Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право*, *11*(5), 219-235.

Chheang, V. (2018). China's economic statecraft in Southeast Asia.

Choudhury, V., & Jacob, J. T. (2025). China in Egypt: Converting Economic Engagement into Political Capital. *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies*, *33*(1) :55-71 .DOI: 10.32381/JIOS.2025.33.01.5

Dahdal, A. M., & Ghafar, A. A. (2025). The Digital Silk Road:"Tech-Diplomacy" as a Paradigm for Understanding Technological Adoption and Emerging Digital Regulations in MENA. *Asian Journal of Law and Society*, 12(2):1-26 .DOI: 10.1017/als.2024.30

De Beule, et al. (2024). The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative: strategic responses of governments and multinational companies. *Asia Pacific Business Review*, *30*(2), 209-219. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602381.2022.2093529

Defense-arabic. (2025). Close military relations between the Egyptian and Chinese armies. https://www.defense-arabic.com/

Duchesne, R. (2023). Historical Consciousness Across Time and Space: Historiography in the West Versus Other Cultures. *Mankind Quarterly*, *64*(1), 32-75. DOI: 10.46469/mq.2023.64.1.4.

El-Din, G. E. (2025). Closer military ties with China. *ahramonlin*. Available at: https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/545046.aspx

Elmaghraby, B. (2023). China-Egypt Relations: A Model for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In *Routledge Companion to China and the Middle East and North Africa* (pp. 273-291). Routledge.

Ferchen, M., & Mattlin, M. (2023). Five modes of China's economic influence: rethinking Chinese economic statecraft. *The Pacific Review*, *36*(5), 978-1004. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2200029

Freedman, R. O. (1986). Economic Statecraft. By David A. Baldwin.(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. ix+ 406. 15.95, paper.). *American Political Science Review*, *80*(3), 1059-1060.

Fulton, J., & Council, A. (2020). Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on "US-China Relations in 2020: Enduring Problems and Emerging Challenges". Available at: gov: https://www. uscc. gov/hearings/us-china-relations-2020-enduring-problems-and-emerging-challenges.

Gadallah, Y. M. (2016). An analysis of the evolution of Sino-Egyptian economic relations. In *Toward Well-Oiled Relations? China's Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring* (pp. 94-114). Springer.

Ghafarzadeh, M. et al. (2023). China's strategic partnership diplomacy and its approach to West-Asia. *The Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World*, *4*(4), 53-79. [in Persian]

Helou, A. (2025). *In a first, Egypt conducts military drills with China, signaling closer ties*. breakingdefense.com. Available at:https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/in-a-first-egypt-conducts-military-drills-with-china-signaling-closer-ties/. (Accessed on: April 22, 2025)

Hillman, J. E. (2020). *The emperor's new road: China and the project of the century*. Yale University Press.

Horn, S. et al. (2021). China's overseas lending. *Journal of International Economics*, *133*, 103539. DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103539.

International, U. W. (2025). *Egypt imposes China in the equations of "strategic balance" in the Middle East*. United World International. Available at: https://unitedworldint.com/36683-egypt-imposes-china-in-the-equations-of-strategic-balance-in-the-middle-east/. (Accessed on: 2025, May7).

Kapstein, E. B. (2020). Afterword: Economic statecraft: continuity and change. *Economic statecraft*, 391-433.

Krukowska, M. (2024). China's security relations with Africa in the 21st century. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, *46*(2), 4-23. DOI: https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/190066.

Li, H. (2020). China's economic statecraft toward East Asia. *Social Transformations in Chinese Societies*, *16*(2), 151-166. DOI: 10.1108/STICS-04-2020-0010.

Li, M. (2017). *China's economic statecraft: Co-optation, cooperation and coercion* (Vol. 39). World Scientific.

MA, W., & ZHAO, J. (2020). China-Egypt financial cooperation: developments and problems. *International Relations*, *8*(03), 104-109.

Norris, W. J. (2016). *Chinese economic statecraft: Commercial actors, grand strategy, and state control*. Cornell University Press.

Oliveira, A. d. (2016). Energy security: A Brazilian Chinese strategic alliance. *revista tempo do mundo,rtm* 2 (1): 1-28.

Power, M., & Mohan, G. (2010). Towards a critical geopolitics of China's engagement with African development. *Geopolitics*, *15*(3), 462-495.

Rakha, A., & El-Aasar, K. (2024). The impact of the belt and road initiative on the Suez Canal cargo trade. *Journal of Shipping and Trade*, *9*(1), DOI: 10.1186/s41072-024-00167-y.

Reda Abu Hatab, A. et al. (2012). Exploring Egypt-China bilateral trade: dynamics and prospects. *Journal of Economic Studies*, *39*(3), 314-326.

Reilly, J. (2013). China's economic statecraft: turning wealth into power. LOWY INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY. Analysis, 1-23.

Roberts, P. (2021). Economic statecraft with Chinese characteristics: Strange, new, and different, or old wine in new bottles? *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, *50*(3), 267-293. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211061750.

Rolland, N. (2017). *China's Eurasian century?: Political and strategic implications of the belt and road initiative*. National Bureau of Asian Research.

Salem, M. (2017). Discover the key milestones of Egypt–China military cooperation. Available at:https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/1575795.aspx

Scott, E. (2013). China goes global in Egypt: a special economic zone in Suez. CCS Discussion paper, February 2013. Stellenbosch University, Centre for Chinese Studies: 36 p.

Selim, G. M., & Moaaz, R. S. (2021). Sino-Egyptian relations post-2013: The dynamics and challenges of an emerging strategic partnership. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, *43*(4), 349-370.

Service, S. I., & Egypt, Y. G. t. (2025). *Egypt's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus Summit*. https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/212745?lang=en-us&utm_

Shih, L., & Cao, W. (2022). The Impact of the "Belt and Road Initiative" on International Scholarship Students. *Frontiers in Sociology*, *7*, 793018. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2022.793018

Shumilov, M. M., & Malova, A. E. (2024). The Commercial Importance of the Suez Canal in the Context of the Crisis of Economic Globalization and Modern Geopolitical Risks. *ЕВРАЗИЙСКАЯ ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ*, 178-188.

Smith, M. (2014). EU-China relations and the limits of economic diplomacy. *Asia Europe Journal*, *12*(1), 35-48.

Sun, D. (2017). China and the Middle East security governance in the new era. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, *10*(3), 354-371.

Sun, D., & Xu, R. (2023). China and Egypt's comprehensive strategic partnership in the Xi-sisi era: A 'role theory'prism. *Mediterranean Politics*, *28*(5), 1-21. DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2022.2035139

Taylor, I. (2009). *China's new role in Africa*. Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO.

Tyushka, A., Czechowska, L., Domachowska, A., Gawron-Tabor, K., & Piechowiak-Lamparska, J. (2019). States, international organizations and strategic partnerships: theorizing an 'ideal model'. *States, International Organizations and Strategic Partnerships*, 44-80.

Wibisono, A. N. (2019). China's "Belt and Road Initiative" in Sri Lanka: Debt Diplomacy in Hambantota Port Investment. *Mandala: Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional*, *2*(2). DOI: 10.33822/mjihi.v2i2.1482.

Winton, D. W. (2013). China's Economic Statecraft in Africa: Implications for the US Rebalance. Doi: 10.55540/0031-1723.2958.

Wishnick, E. (2007). Why a 'Strategic Partnership?'. The View from China," paper presented at the Conference on China-Russia Relations in the 21st Century, Washington, DC,

Wiśniewski, R. (2020). States, International Organisations and Strategic Partnerships. *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, *49*, 216-218. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2020414

Yu, L. (2025). China-Russia Strategic Partnership. In *The Rise of China and the China-Russia Strategic Partnership* (pp. 41-84). Springer.

Yu, L., & Sui, S. (2020). China-Russia military cooperation in the context of Sino-Russian strategic partnership. *Asia Europe Journal*, *18*(3), 325-345. DOI: 10.1007/s10308-019-00559-x.

Yue, S. (2018). Towards a global partnership network: Implications, evolution and prospects of China's partnership diplomacy. *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, *36*(2), 5-27. DOI: 10.22439/cjas.v36i2.5647.

Zreik, M. (2024). Econometric Analysis of China-Egypt Bilateral Relations: Trade, Investment, and Economic Cooperation. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, *18*(2), 149-167. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2024.2366067.