Iran-Russia Military and Security Relations after the JCPOA

Alireza Samoudi
Amirhossein Norouzi Shahtouri *

ABSTRACT Iran and Russia's military and security cooperation have considerably increased after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, UK and the US). Using the concepts of securitization and desecuritization in the Copenhagen School of security studies, the authors examine the military and security ties between Iran and Russia. The main research question is as follows: How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) affected the Iranian-Russian military and security relations? The main objective is to test a hypothesis asserting that the JCPOA desecuritized the Iranian nuclear program and removed the obstacles in Iran's relations with Russia in bilateral, regional and international levels. In fact, Iran's nuclear program changed into a technical issue and was desecuritized after the nuclear deal. This led to a noticeable improvement of Iran's relations with Russia and other countries. The removal of the Russian sanctions against Iran and the numerous visits of the two countries’ government officials as well as Putin's order to lift the ban on the sale of the S300 missile systems to Tehran are among the most important indicators of the improvement of security relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, the Russian military presence in Syria along with Moscow’s cooperation with Iran in the fight against terrorism are viewed as other important post-JCPOA developments which have improved Iranian-Russian bilateral military cooperation at the regional level.

Keywords Copenhagen School; Desecuritization; Iran; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); Military; Non-securitization; Russian Federation; Security; Securitization

Introduction

The occurrence of various negotiations, consultations, and frequent visits proves the claim that Iran's military and security relations with Russia today are of great importance and are at the highest level. The JCPOA and the removal of the international sanctions on Iran, as well

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as the heightened tensions between Russia and the West over Ukraine led to the realization of the two countries' leaders that they have no choice but to boost their military and security cooperation in different spheres for the purpose of countering the Western security-military threats and preventing the unsolicited foreign interference in regional and global affairs.

Here is the main question: How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) affected the Iranian-Russian military and security relations? The authors’ research hypothesis is that the JCPOA descuritized the Iranian nuclear program and removed many obstacles in Iran’s military-security relations with Russia. At the bilateral level, the constant negotiations and consultations of the two sides, their military cooperation and agreement on Syria, the renewal of the S-300 deal and arms delivery to Iran should be analyzed. At the regional level, these two important actors have shared interests in confronting terrorist threats and blocking U.S. interventionism in the Middle East, especially in Syria. At the international level, the two states are opposed to the U.S. unilateral actions and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s eastward enlargement.

The Ukraine crisis and the heightened tensions in the West-Russia relations, the subsequent Western sanctions on Russia, the implementation of the nuclear deal and the easing of the anti-Iran sanctions have paved the way for the intensified cooperation between Moscow and Tehran to counter common military-security threats. The JCPOA removed various restrictions imposed on the two countries' relations. In the military-security sphere, the lifting of the ban on the sale of the Russian-made S-300 air defense systems to Iran after the nuclear deal is significant. Furthermore, the two countries' cooperation in the Syrian crisis has dramatically increased.

**The Theoretical Framework: The Copenhagen School’s Approach to Security Studies**

The Copenhagen School’s approach to security studies is a term applied by Bill McSweeney to refer to the works by Barry Buzan, Ole Waver, De Wild, and other scholars. This school offers one of the very few leading approaches to security studies and promotes a better place for these studies in academic circles. The Copenhagen School intends to define the concept of security in a broader context than its military
component. Consequently, this outlook involves the evaluation of security issues in political, economic, social, environmental and other non-military domains. According to the Copenhagen School, the tendency to overemphasize military aspects of security has pushed non-military issues to a corner. Security has been studied from different perspectives, some of which have attracted more attention. One of the most controversial issues in the Copenhagen School is securitization. In the Copenhagen School, hence, securitization is not only a verbal action or social structure, but also an act of politics. Securitization is the stabilization of a mental foundation for an existential threat which serves an excuse for the development of a desired political outcome. The threat should be successfully developed and well adopted for the intended audience (Majidi and Samoudi, 2014: 195).

Securitization found its way to international relations in the mid-1990s after it was coined by Weaver. It was further developed in 1998 after the publication of Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Securitization is a central concept in the Copenhagen School, and the definition of security as a verbal action is the core of this topic. In securitization, an issue is identified as a security problem because of its features; and a convincing reason might justify its high importance in a given political agenda in which it is classified as an absolute priority for the policy makers. Securitization is possible in all military and nonmilitary areas, and it identically works at all dimensions of security. Therefore, securitization is a more radical form of politicization; and it is a continuing and open process which is influenced by a group of other factors (Buzan et al., 1998: 51). In the framework of securitization, there are two conditions for security issues: securitizing actors and breaking the existing rules and procedures.

Buzan indicates that securitizing actors might be media, political leaders, governments, lobbies, and pressure groups, as in Iran’s nuclear case where the West securitized the issue using its media monopoly. Since 2006, and especially after 2010, Western and regional states joined the United States sanctions against Iran after the securitization of Iran’s nuclear program (Katzman, 2016: 32). In fact, securitizing actors show that security is an issue which is created, rather than the one to be discovered. A securitizing actor may announce an issue to be securitized (Omidi and Moradifar, 2014: 127).

Non-securitization is the opposite side of securitization. It defines a condition whereby a securitized issue returns to the sphere of political discourse and debates. Those who oversee securitization are
able to draw back the trend and return it to the purview of ordinary politics. On non-securitization, Barry Buzan writes:

Securitization implies that we take out a security analysis from any and all quotidian threats, elevating them to a national level. To prevent this downfall, which ends in attenuation of national security, we should have a certain criterion to diagnose national security threats from the rest. After setting these criteria, we will be able to separate security threats from the rest and non-securitize basic issues (2000: 12).

Desecuritization involves the process of moving from political affairs and returning to the sphere of political discourse and the possibility of political debates. After the JCPOA was signed, Iran’s nuclear program was desecuritized. The JCPOA was able to change a security issue into a technical and political one. The pre-JCPOA security trends were slaked and trends were changed from an opposing state of affairs to an interactive one. The mentality that Iran will not seek weapons of mass destruction or, at least, its suspect activities will be monitored, will lead Iran’s regional rivals to believe that Iran will not pose an existential threat to their security. This will desecuritize Iran’s program, and prevent Iran from being considered as an issue of security. After the JCPOA, the international sanctions that hampered Iran’s cooperation with the global community due to the securitization of its nuclear program were lifted. Iran’s nuclear program was securitized by some countries, particularly the US and its regional allies, and it had an impact on other countries, as well (Rostami and Naderi, 2016: 189).

Even, friendly and neighboring countries, such as the Russian Federation, felt threatened by Iran’s nuclear program under the impact of Western media and reduced its bilateral relations on the pretext of the anti-Iran international sanctions. The examples of the sanctions imposed on the country included its exclusion from full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the failure of Russia to deliver the S-300 air defense systems to Iran. In the post-JCPOA era, however, Iran’s nuclear activities were desecuritized and Iran-Russia relations experienced a substantial improvement in various military and security areas.

The following table shows the non-securitization trend:
### Table 1 - The Desecuritization of Iran's Nuclear Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The 1st Step:</th>
<th>The 2nd Step:</th>
<th>The 3rd Step:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(An attempt to remove Iran's nuclear program from the UN Security Council's agenda.)</td>
<td>(The emphasis on the continuation of political talks between Iran and P5+1.)</td>
<td>(Returning to technical issues.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(An attempt to weaken anti-Iran sanctions.)</td>
<td>(Emphasis on the non-security nature of the issue.)</td>
<td>(Returning the dossier to the IAEA.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(An attempt to desecuritize the issue.)</td>
<td></td>
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Source: (Samoudi, 2017: 355).

### The Post-JCPOA Iran-Russia Relations

The JCPOA has left considerable impact on Iran-Russia relations; and many excuses used by the Russian side to limit the bilateral cooperation were weakened in the post-JCPOA period. As we mentioned previously, Russia's political and military officials were ready to engage in dialogue with their Iranian counterparts to strengthen their bilateral cooperation at the regional and international levels.

Iran-Russia military and defense collaborations date back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the formation of the Russian Federation. Iran-Russia military cooperation in the 1990s attracted the attention of Western media, which from time to time broadcasted news reports on Iran-Russia missile collaborations. Since the early-1990s, Iran-Russia military cooperation was met with serious oppositions by the US, whose leaders did their best to thwart further collaborations between Iran and Russia. The then U.S. Vice-President arranged a round of intensive negotiations with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that culminated in a June 1995 secret agreement aimed at restricting Russia’s sales of military equipment and services to Iran (Kassianova, 2006: 46).
Moscow agreed to provide Iran only with weapons listed in the 1989 bilateral military deal of the Soviet Union and Iran and committed not to sell advanced weapons to Iran. Vladimir Putin’s rise to power as the new president of Russia paved the way for increased military cooperation between Iran and Russia. Russia’s foreign policy doctrine, which was approved by Putin in June 2000, facilitated Moscow’s collaborations with countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran. This doctrine underscored the pursuance of an independent and constructive foreign policy by the Russian Federation. Significantly, there was a clear reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran in this strategic document, which specified that relationship with Iran would be important to Russia. Accordingly, Moscow shall pursue the establishment of a multipolar system of international relations which reflects the diversity of the ‘New World’ and its broadened interests. This document, together with Putin’s foreign policy orientation, helped the enhancement of Iran-Russia relations. The foremost development was the annulment of the Russian Federation’s Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in November 2000. One month later, Russian Minister of Defense made a three-day visit to Iran to discuss the bilateral defense collaborations (Amiri, 2010:7).

This was the first travel to Iran of a Russian Minister of Defense since the 1979 Iranian revolution. In December 2005, the two countries announced that they had signed an air defense contract worth over 700 million dollars. Later, the enforcement of sanctions against Iran, especially those by the UN Security Council, limited Iran-Russia defense cooperation insofar as Moscow failed to deliver to Iran the S-300 air defense systems in accordance with the 2007 bilateral contract (Trenin and Malashenko, 2010:23).

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation experienced an important development in their military and defense relations especially after the Ukraine crisis, which led to improved conditions for defense collaborations of the two countries. These developments form a turning-point in Iran-Russia defense deals. In the post-JCPOA period, many cooperation barriers were removed and Tehran-Moscow military-security relations were improved (Amiri, 2015: 90). Three aspects of the post-JCPOA Iran-Russia defense and military relations shall be discussed in more detail in the next section:

A. Negotiations and Consultations: There has been a major development in the frequency and levels of contacts between Iranian-Russian senior political and military officials since 2015. President
Hasan Rouhani held talks with his Russia counterpart Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the joint session of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in July 2015. Iranian and Russian leaders agreed to expand their cooperation by removing arms embargo and other sanctions against Iran. In their bilateral negotiations, Iranian and Russian Foreign Ministers announced that they have planned for further development of military and security collaborations after the removal of international sanctions. The visit of Iran’s Minister of Defense to Moscow in April 2015 for participation in the Fourth International Security Summit, and the travel of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Moscow in April 2015 are other examples of the bilateral negotiations (Amiri, 2015: 91).

B. Military Agreements: During the trip of the Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu to Tehran in January 2015, Iran and Russia concluded a military agreement which encompassed the bilateral cooperation for combatting terrorism, the exchange of military personnel for training purposes, and the reciprocal use of the port facilities of the two countries by their naval forces. Shoygu was the first Russian Minister of Defense that traveled to Iran after 15 years. As the way for more bilateral defense agreements was smoothed, Iran voiced its interest in procuring its required military equipment from the Russian Federation. In December 2015, the IRI Army Ground Force Commander announced that he had submitted to the headquarters of the Armed Forces a proposal to purchase the Russian-made T-90 tanks. Moreover, Iran is inclined to dispatch its military experts to Russia for gaining experience on the application of modern defense equipment. The Iranian Commander declared that: “Iranian experts will travel to the Russian Federation for the purposes of contracts in this respect” (Bobkin, 2015: 103).

C. The Renewal of the S-300 Missile Defense System Contract: Vladimir Putin’s decision to abolish the ban on the sales of the S-300 marks another sign of the improvement of Iran-Russia defense relations. During Vladimir Putin’s second term of office, Iran and Russia reached an agreement for the transfer of this air defense systems to Iran in 2007. However, three years later, Dmitry Medvedev who wished to rehabilitate Russia’s relations with the West, shrank from the implementation of this contract. Russia declared that the delivery of the S-300 missile systems is in contradiction with the UN Security Council resolutions against Iran, but Medvedev’s decision was basically made
under the pressures exerted by Israel. This led Iran to announce its determination to file a lawsuit against Russia in international courts. Following the conclusion of the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 in April 2015, Putin abolished the ban on the delivery of S-300 to Iran. In May 2015, the deputy secretary at Russian Security Council Yevgeny Lukyanov announced that the delivery of this defense systems to Iran has been approved (Hollinger et al., 2015: 13).

**The Post-JCPOA Iran-Russia Regional Cooperation**

The two countries’ military, defense, and intelligence collaborations in the two Middle East crisis situations in Iraq and Syria have been significant in the recent years. Russia has played an active role in the international decision-making processes since the start of the Syrian crisis. Moscow’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria by conducting air attacks against the terrorist groups could considerably enhance Russian position in that country. The presence of Russian forces in Syria could draw Russia and Iran closer, because both of them support President Bashar al-Assad and oppose the US-led regime change strategy. Russians got more directly involved in this crisis following high-level consultations with Iranian political leaders and senior military officials who traveled to Moscow to attend meetings aimed at assisting the Syrian government (Amiri, 2015: 93).

Noticeably, the conclusion of the nuclear deal and the worsening of the Syrian crisis improved Iran-Russia military and defense collaborations at the regional level. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Iran and Russia have extended their political and diplomatic supports to Damascus. When the Syrian government was unable to defeat ISIS terrorists in 2015, Iran and Russia realized that their cooperation is required for keeping Assad in power. In fact, this meant that the two countries must coordinate their policies toward Syria. Accordingly, Iran and Russia activated their military cooperation to fight against the armed terrorists in Syria. The Russian military jets escorted the Iranian-led fighters in their confrontations with the terrorists; and Iran permitted Russia to use its air space to fire missiles over the Caspian Sea against the Syrian territories controlled by the terrorists. Iran and Russia put up an information exchange center against the ISIS terrorist group in Baghdad with the Iraqi and Syrian collaborations. This center, which is administered by the four states, is
intended to exchange and analyze data before transferring them to the pertinent commanders and soldiers (Stuster, 2015: 28).

**The New Russian Approach to the Middle East**

As an important regional subsystem, the Middle East has long been the scene of the great power competition because of its unique geopolitical and geostrategic advantages. It is therefore not surprising that Russia has decided to play a more active role in the Middle Eastern crises, because the Russian decision makers wish to reclaim the USSR great power position in the international system.

Table 2 - The Main Causes of the Importance of the Middle East in Russia’s Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Causes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Russia’s Geographical proximity to the Middle East</td>
<td>The distance between Grozny, the capital city of the Chechen Republic, and the Iraqi territory is 600 miles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Muslim population in the Russian Federation</td>
<td>Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, no wall separates the growing Russian Muslims population and the Muslims living in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arab world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Russian Jews residing in Israel</td>
<td>Following the post-USSR large-scale Jewish migration, about 20 percent of Israel’s population is made up of the former Soviet Jews who speak Russian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Persistent political and religious conflicts in the Islamic world</td>
<td>The militant and extremist ideology spread from the Middle East to the Muslim-inhabited Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and elsewhere in Russia and its periphery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Rich energy sources in the region</td>
<td>Russia regards itself as an energy superpower and looks for the opportunities in its southern borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-US presence in the Middle East</td>
<td>US-Russia competition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Trenin, 2010: 34).

The export of arms to the Middle Eastern states is important for Russia, which pays significant attention to the lucrative market for its
arms sales like some Western arms exporters. In the Middle East, the customers of the Russian-made weapons are willing to pay large sums of money, and arms trade with the regional states provides Russia with the much-needed foreign currency for its economic growth. The Middle East occupies a pivotal stance in the contemporary international politics, and its importance will increase in the future (Zargar, 2013: 75). Moscow has realized that its presence in the Middle East is contingent upon its collaborations with the influential regional players such as Iran. For this reason, Russians have expanded their military-security interactions with Iran. Russia has not confined its Middle East policies to Iran and has attempted to pave the way for its increased presence in the region by seeking military agreements and collaborations with other Middle Eastern states. Moscow’s military agreements with Egypt, for instance, are indicative of its new approach to the Middle East. In February 2014, Moscow and Cairo signed an arms contract worth 3.5 billion dollars for helicopters, military jets, and defense systems. Considering the nature of the recent Moscow-Tehran regional and global cooperation, it is likely that Russia will be willing to boost its military collaborations with Tehran to facilitate its involvement in the region. The cooperation with Iran might be a guarantee for Russia’s continued presence in the Middle East, which might provide it with a powerful leverage in its relations with the West (Bobkin, 2015: 111).

Iran-Russia Policies toward Trans-Regional Issues

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the lessening of Russia’s power, higher degree of political, cultural, and economic exchanges between the two states have been observed. Iran and Russia no longer felt threatened by the other side; and they saw themselves standing against common threats (Atrisangari, 2015: 160). At the international level, Iran and Russia tend to reject the US-led Western unilateralism and the NATO’s eastward expansion.

The relations between the Russian Federation and Western states have considerably deteriorated. Tensions increased after the Ukraine crisis because of the US and Western countries’ supports for the pro-Western forces, and the Russian annexation of the Crimea as well as its supports for the separatists in eastern Ukraine. In reaction to this crisis, Western countries imposed sanctions against Moscow,
which in retaliation placed agricultural sanctions against European states. This tension added another justified reason for the Kremlin to boost its relations with Tehran (Kozhanov, 2015: 11).

As an unprecedented post-Cold War event, the Ukraine crisis convinced Moscow to improve its relations with the Middle Eastern states to prevent its international isolation. In fact, the West’s sanctions against Moscow brought about a further closeness between Iran and Russia. The West’s sanctions placed Iran and Russia ‘in the same boat’, floating toward a common destination. The absence of a clear solution for the Ukraine crisis will help the continuation of Russia’s positive attitude toward Iran. Likewise, tensions in the NATO-Russia relations could pave the way for further military and defense collaborations between Iran and Russia. Moscow might choose to defy arms embargo against Iran by selling more advanced weapons to Tehran even though the European Union and the US consider such transactions as threatening (Bodner, 2015: 25).

The problems confronted by Russia in its relations with the West are not limited to Ukraine; and the two sides have long been in disagreement over issues such as the eastward expansion of NATO. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the NATO members looked for a new strategic concept, according to which they decided to admit countries in the former Eastern bloc to ensure the survival of the Western alliance. The former communist countries of Eastern Europe, Baltic region, Central Asia and the Caucasus were placed at the heart of this geographical expansion. Despite their diverging positions, Iran and Russia consider the presence of NATO in the periphery of Eurasia threatening for their national interests and regional security. That is why the Russia and Iranian attitudes toward the eastward expansion of the NATO have been identical (Kouzegar Kaleji, 2015: 143).

Aligned with its policies to oppose the presence of the extra-regional powers in the Middle East, Iran has adopted a critical position against the presence of NATO in Central Asian and South Caucasus. To confront the perceived and real security and military threats posed by the presence of the US and the NATO in its peripheral areas, Iran applied for a full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2005. In contrast to Iran’s unfluctuating approach toward the NATO expansion, Russia has adopted a more flexible position relative to the domestic, regional, and international developments (Asgarian, 2015: 145).
The Russian Federation embraced a cooperation approach with the NATO in three time periods: the early-1990s (due to the Euro-Atlantic discourse and transition problems); the post-9/11 period from September 2001 to 2005 (due to the need to cooperate in the fight against international terrorism and the perceived common security threats); and finally in 2009-2012 period (due to the adoption of coordinated policies by Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama aimed at improving Russia-US relations). On the opposing side, we can identify three time periods in which Russia was in confrontation with the NATO. These included: the second half of the 1990s (as a result of the NATO’s intervention in the Balkan); 2005-2008 years (as a result of the membership of some Baltic states in the NATO and the deployment of an anti-missile defense shield in Eastern Europe); and 2013 to the present (due to the clash of the Russian Federation with the Western countries over the Syrian and Ukrainian crises) (Asgarian, 2015: 145).

On 15 June 2015, the Russian Prime Minister Medvedev issued a resolution to stop the transmission of the NATO’s arms and supplies to Afghanistan via the Russian Northern Distribution Network (NDN). In the revised 2014 military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the NATO and the US have been listed as Russia’s number one enemies. In its revised 2016 national strategy document published on 31 December 2015, it was stated: “[T]he NATO has advanced to the borders of the Russian Federation and this is a threat for national security of Russia. The NATO is expanding its military and weaponry capabilities in the regions adjacent to Russia. This suggests that the principles of equitable and indivisible security are not respected in the Asia-Pacific, Eurasia, and Europe-America regions” (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015).

**Iran’s Strategies for the Improvement of its Relations with Russia**

As far as Iran’s requirements are concerned, different solutions are required to take advantage of the military-security cooperation with the Russian Federation. In the broader policy-making level, these solutions are as follows:

First, the JCPOA nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 has provided an opportunity for the development of Iran-Russia ties. The JCPOA’s breakdown would create a major barrier for the expansion of
Iran’s foreign relations with Russia, China and other countries. Therefore, it is recommended to prevent its failure to assure the continuation of Iran-Russia cooperation (Asgarian, 2015: 103).

Second, a review of the background of defense and military cooperation between the two countries demonstrates that the nature of relations between Iran and the West has had a positive impact on the degree of compliance of the Russian Federation to its obligations toward Iran. The decline of Iran-Russia relations and even Moscow’s inattention to its obligations toward Iran were concurrent with Iran’s highest political tensions with the US and European countries. These tensions increased the Western countries’ pressures on Russia to cut its defense ties with Iran. Since the interactions with Europe are less challenging than those with the US, attempts are made to regulate relations with European countries to the extent that Iran-Russia military relations are influenced by the Western countries’ reactions. Such policies should at least prevent the reemergence of a tense political climate in Iran-Europe relations (Asgarian, 2015: 103).

Third, Russia, in its new foreign policy planning, has emphasized its focus on the Middle East, and has indicated its determination to expand its influence in the region. To achieve this, Moscow is clearly inclined to take advantage of Iran’s assistance as an important regional actor. Iran’s cooperation in this area could be contingent on the fulfillment of Moscow’s commitments to its defense arrangements with Tehran for the transfer of conventional weapons and military technology.

Fourth, Russia’s involvement in Syria requires an increase in its cooperation with Iran; and this could lead to an opportunity to enhance bilateral military and defense collaborations in other areas.

Fifth, the success of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy, which is influenced by a crisis in its relations with the West, has increased Moscow’s need for key partners such as China, India, and Iran. This provides Iran with an opportunity to increase its interactions with Russia (Asgarian, 2015: 104). For example, the recent developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus indicate the infiltrations of Salafists and Takfiris in some of the regional countries, which make them vulnerable to the extremist ideology of the ISIS terrorist group. In view of Russia’s concerns about the security of the former Soviet republics, it is possible to encourage Moscow-Tehran cooperation in combating terrorism in Central Eurasia and forcing the withdrawal of these extremists from the region.
Conclusion

The military and security cooperation between Iran and Russia have dramatically increased after the nuclear deal. The implementation of the JCPOA and the lifting of the ban on the sale of the S-300 air defense systems to Iran after the nuclear deal indicated that the two countries might expand their security cooperation in the future. The Russian military presence in Syria and Tehran-Moscow's intention to fight terrorist groups in the Middle East have promoted the bilateral relations at the regional level. It is worth noting that there are some factors which could enhance the two actors' cooperation for the years to come, and even pave the way to the formation of some sort of a strategic alliance. The obstacles and challenges, which might halt these improved relations, should be managed and contained. However, the more the two states seek to expand their military-security relations, the more the destructive efforts of certain third parties to disrupt the bilateral cooperation will be observed.

Authors' Statement: The authors declare that they have fully observed all ethical issues including plagiarism, double publication and/or submission, redundancy, data fabrication and/or falsification, informed consent, misconduct, etc.

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